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SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADE SECRET
MISAPPROPRIATION: A COMMENT
Robert G. Bonet

I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Rustad's article focuses on a problem that has received
serious attention in recent years: the involvement of foreign countries
in misappropriating trade secrets from American firms. 1 In 1996,
Congress adopted the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA") to help
address this problem.
Professor Rustad reviews the Act's
enforcement record and finds it wanting; relatively few cases have
been brought and many of these cases have resulted in only mild
sanctions. 2 He identifies several reasons for this poor record, most of
which are traceable in one way or another to the statute's exclusive
reliance on public enforcement. 3 He recommends two reforms: (1)
add a private cause of action to the EEA, and (2) extend civil liability
to third party software manufacturers and vendors whose negligently

t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank the
participants in the Santa Clara Conference on Third Party Liability in Intellectual Property Law
for many helpful questions and comments. I am especially grateful to Joe Bauer and my
colleague Michael Meurer for their suggestions.
1. Michael L. Rustad, Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER

& HIGH TECH. L. J. 455 (2006).

2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000).
3. The EEA uses criminal sanctions as its primary enforcement mechanism, id. §§ 1831,
1832, but it also authorizes the Attorney General to obtain injunctive relief, id. § 1836.
According to Professor Rustad's account, there appear to be three chief obstacles to enforcement
that stem from the choice of a public rather than private mechanism and the reliance on criminal
sanctions. First, affected firms are reluctant to report trade secret thefts, in large part because
they worry that the federal government will be less careful about protecting the finn's interests
in the resulting litigation than the firms themselves would be. For example, an affected firm with
control over the litigation can conduct the lawsuit to limit reputation harms from adverse
publicity and better manage the risks of trade secret disclosure. Second, the federal government
has limited resources to investigate and prosecute EEA cases, especially since 9/I1, when
fighting terrorism became a top priority. These resource limitations are especially problematic
for criminal prosecutions because of the government's heavy burden of proof and the wellknown difficulties in trade secret cases of uncovering evidence and identifying perpetrators.
Third, the federal government strongly prefers to bring cases of domestic rather than foreign
espionage because of procedural problems and concerns about foreign policy repercussions.
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designed software enables trade secret misappropriation.
This Comment focuses critically on these reforms, and especially
on the second proposal. Part II briefly examines the basic premise
underlying Professor Rustad's arguments, that foreign theft is a
sufficiently serious problem today to warrant bolstering legal
protection for trade secrets. I am skeptical of this proposition and
Part II explains why. Part III focuses on the specifics of Professor
Rustad's secondary liability proposal. Here too my message is one of
restraint. Even if stronger legal protection is a good idea, it is not at
all clear that imposing liability on software manufacturers and
vendors for negligent enablement is a desirable way to do it given the
potentially high social costs and the likely superiority of a contract
alternative.
I should state a caveat at the outset. This Comment is not
intended to be a complete and rigorous analysis of the many
complicated issues involved. Its goal is to raise questions and express
doubts that can be the basis of further research and analysis.
II. THE TRADE SECRET THEFT PROBLEM - How SERIOUS ISIT?
Professor Rustad makes a number of strong claims about the
magnitude and seriousness of the foreign trade secret theft problem,
referring at one point to an "astonishing rise in economic espionage
and its colossal cost to business" and at another to "overwhelming
evidence of widespread state sponsored economic espionage."'4 It is
not at all clear, however, that there is enough reliable empirical
evidence to support these claims, or that Professor Rustad has a
sufficiently articulated normative framework for assessing the
seriousness of the problem. Analytical and empirical rigor is
particularly important when, as here, conclusions about the severity of
the problem are used to support decisions about costly legal
enforcement.
I do not question the fact that foreign governments are involved
in appropriating trade secrets from American firms. 5 However, the
4. Rustad, supra note 1, at 473 ("astonishing rise"), 484 ("overwhelming evidence").
While there is certainly evidence of foreign trade secret theft, I am not aware of "overwhelming
evidence," nor would I necessarily describe the costs as "colossal," at least not without stronger
evidence to support such an extreme characterization. In any event, I would have liked to have
seen a more careful review of the relevant empirical literature and a more critical attitude toward
the political and media sources cited in the article.
5. Furthermore, it seems likely that this practice is on the rise now that the internet and
computer technology make it possible to access secrets from remote locations. See HEDIEH
NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 8-10 (2005). There are numerous
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fact that trade secrets are being taken, even with some frequency, is
not by itself enough to justify stronger legal protection. Legal
intervention through trade secret law can be very costly. We need to
know how much trade secret theft is taking place before we can
balance the benefits of stronger legal protection against the costs.
Professor Rustad does cite several studies which purport to
quantify the magnitude of the problem, and there are also other
existing studies. Most of these studies use survey methodology and
ask firms to report the total number of trade secret loss incidents and
the economic value of those losses. 6 While these surveys provide
some useful information, they also suffer from serious
methodological limitations that undermine their reliability as
measures of trade secret misappropriation. The following account
briefly describes some of these limitations. While the factors
discussed here tend to push the survey results higher than the true loss
level, other factors tend to push in the opposite direction. 7 All of
these factors compound the uncertainty of the results.8
I should state at the outset that I have not read every existing
survey, so I do not know for sure whether all of them have serious
methodological limitations. 9 However, some of the defects identified
documented cases of foreign country involvement. Indeed, in a statement delivered to the
Senate during the 1996 hearings on the EEA, Louis Freeh, then Director of the FBI, reported
that "at least twenty-three foreign governments actively target the intellectual property of U.S.
corporations." Id. at 8.
6. See id. at 60. Also, there is a good deal of reliance on anecdotal evidence. Id. The
problems with anecdotal evidence are well known - there is no assurance that anecdotes are
representative or even accurate descriptions of what actually occurs,
7. For example, a firm might under-report its true losses because it fails to detect an
instance of trade secret theft. Or a firm might decide not to report a known loss out of fear of
potential reputation harms from an accidental public disclosure, despite promises of
confidentiality. However, some studies make an effort to adjust the total estimates to take
account of under-reporting. See, e.g., ASIS INTERNATIONAL, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS &
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Loss: SURVEY REPORT

11 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 ASIS Survey Report], available at
http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.
8. As Professor Nasheri explains: "Quantifying the risks is difficult because we simply
do not have the data.. .[and] what statistics we have are difficult to generalize." NASHERI,
supra note 5, at 60. While Professor Nasheri stresses under-reporting, data uncertainties
actually cut in both directions, as I explain in the text. Even Professor Rustad admits at one
point that "no reliable data exists on basic facts," such as the amount of financial loss due to
misappropriation. Rustad, supra note 1, at 524.
9. I read three surveys in preparing this Comment: (1) the most recent ASIS Survey, see
2002 ASIS Survey Report, supra note 7; (2) the 1995 ASIS Survey Report, see RICHARD J.
HEFFERNAN & DAN T. SMARTWOOD, TRENDS IN INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY Loss SURVEY

(American Society for Industrial Security, Int'l 1995) [hereinafter 1995 ASIS Survey Report];
and (3) the 2005 CSI/FBI Computer Crime Survey, see LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., CSI/FBI
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below would be very difficult, if not practically impossible, to
eliminate. In any event, one thing is clear: when citing survey
evidence, one should be aware of its potential limitations, and should
take those limitations into account when making claims based on the
results.
One problem with trade secret surveys is the difficulty of
verifying that a loss is indeed due to trade secret theft. 10 Trade
secrets, like all forms of information, exhibit the public-good
characteristics of nonexcludability and nonrivalry."1 This means that
a trade secret can be appropriated without depriving the owner of the
information. As a result, a firm might suspect that its trade secret has
been taken, but have very little evidence to support the suspicion and
no evidence to identify the responsible party.12 The suspicion alone
might be enough for the firm to report the loss, especially if the firm
is asked to report suspected as well as known losses. 13 But if the
suspicion turns out to be unfounded, the report will erroneously
inflate survey results.
Another related problem is that not all methods of acquiring
trade secrets are illegal. It is perfectly lawful, for example, to reverseengineer a trade secret or to discover it by searching publicly
available records. Those who complain about economic espionage
are not always careful to distinguish between lawful and unlawful
methods. 14 Indeed, it is not clear how a survey could be designed to
COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY (Computer Security Institute 2005) [hereinafter 2005

CSUFBI Survey], availableat http://www.cybercrime.gov/FBI2005.pdf.
10. In addition, some surveys cover much more than trade secret loss. The CSI/FBI
Computer Crime Survey, for example, collects data on many different kinds of computer
security breach, including virus damage, denial of service losses, laptop theft, and the like. See
2005 CSIIFBI Survey, supra note 9, at 15.
11.

See WILLIAM M.

LANDES & RICHARD A.

POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003). The fact that information is infinitely replicable
at little marginal cost has two important consequences: (1) it means that it is difficult to exclude
others after information is made public (nonexcludability), and (2) it means that everyone can
possess the information without anyone having any less of it (nonrivalry).
12. It should be noted that Professor Rustad is aware of the difficulties with detecting
trade secret theft and identifying the perpetrator. His article mentions the problem repeatedly.
See generally Rustad, supra note 1.
13. For example, the 2002 ASIS Survey Report lumps "suspected losses" together with
"known losses." See 2002 ASIS Survey Report, supra note 7, § 3.2 at 9.
14. For example, Professor Rustad quotes a source that defines "economic espionage" as
"the unlawful or clandestine targeting or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade, or economic
policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical technologies." Rustad, supra
note 1, at 464. Notably, this definition includes both "clandestine" and "unlawful" methods,
even though trade secret law reaches only the latter. As another example, Professor Nasheri, in
her recent book on economic espionage and the EEA, condemns eleven methods of acquiring
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reliably screen out losses due to lawful activity. For example, if Firm
A discovers that Firm B is using information which A keeps as its
trade secret, it would be natural for A to assume wrongdoing and
report the loss in response to a survey question even if B actually
obtained the information in a perfectly lawful way. 15
A third defect is perhaps the most serious of all. 16 The law
protects trade secrets only if the trade secret owner first implements
reasonable security precautions on its own. 17 The idea is to force
firms to use less costly forms of self-help to prevent misappropriation
before allowing them access to costly litigation after a
misappropriation occurs. This means, however, that any survey used
to support more expansive trade secret protection must be limited to
firms that already have reasonable security measures in place. The
problem is that some of the most frequently cited surveys are not
limited in this way. For example, the 2002 ASIS Survey, while it
asks respondents about their security precautions, makes no effort to
exclude firms with inadequate precautions from the reported loss
totals. 18 This omission is particularly salient since there is reason to
believe that many firms neglect their security needs and could easily
avoid some of their information losses if they installed reasonable
security measures. 19
trade secrets as "tools of the espionage community." Her list includes several methods that
seem to be perfectly lawful: "scanning trade-show floors," "combing through websites,"
"reviewing filings with regulatory agencies," "using data-mining software to search the Internet
at high speeds for information," and "attending competitors' court trials." See NASHERI, supra
note 5, at 7-8.
15. The 1995 ASIS Survey Report asks respondents to identify the method by which the
loss occurred. However, some of the categories, such as copyright, patent, or trademark
violation, do not involve trade secret appropriation at all, and some are described in such vague
language that they give firms an opportunity to report losses of unknown cause - something
even the ASIS Report itself concedes. 1995 ASIS Survey Report, supra note 9, at 12-13. In any
case, given the difficulties of detecting and investigating trade secret theft, identification of the
method of acquisition is bound to involve a lot of guesswork.
16. There are other defects as well. For instance, many of the most frequently cited
surveys are sponsored by groups with an obvious self-interest in the results, such as the
American Society for Industrial Security (which is an association of security professionals) and
PricewaterhouseCooper Cybercrime Prevention and Response (CPR) Group (which advises
companies on their security needs). See, e.g., 2002 ASIS Survey Report, supra note 7, at 3.
17. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 1.03-1.04 (2005).
Notably, the EEA also includes this limitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000).
18. In fairness, I should make clear that the ASIS survey was not designed specifically
with an eye to advocating for broader legal protection. In fact, one of its major goals is to
encourage firms to adopt stronger security measures on their own. See 2002 ASIS Survey
Report, supra note 7, at 28.
19. Indeed, the 2002 ASIS Survey Report itself found widespread neglect of security
needs among firms reporting losses. It also found a strong negative correlation between the
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My point is simple: we do not have enough reliable empirical
evidence to be sufficiently confident of the magnitude of the
misappropriation problem to advocate strongly for legal reform. It
bears repeating that it is not enough simply that stronger trade secret
protection would prevent more trade secret thefts. Trade secret law
generates substantial costs of its own so the benefits of stronger
protection must be substantial as well.
Like many advocates of broader trade secret protection,
Professor Rustad argues at times as if he believes that an ideal legal
system would prevent all trade secret appropriation. His use of the
word "theft" is suggestive in this regard. It trades on strong moral
intuitions and conjures up images of criminals stealing tangible
property. An intangible trade secret, however, is very different from
tangible property, and the differences make enforcing trade secret
rights much more costly than enforcing other types of property rights.
Two features of trade secrets are particularly salient in this
regard: their quality as information and their quality as secrets.
Because information can be taken without leaving a trace behind, it
can be extremely difficult to establish that a trade secret has been
misappropriated, and equally difficult to identify the perpetrator. As a
result, detection and investigation can be very costly and civil suits
and criminal proceedings expensive to litigate. 20 Moreover, these
costs tend to escalate as trade secret appropriators respond to greater
investments in detection and investigation by adopting more
sophisticated and difficult to detect appropriation techniques. Indeed,
this dynamic can turn into a costly arms race if trade secret owners
respond to more sophisticated appropriation techniques by adopting
more sophisticated detection and investigation counter-measures,
thereby triggering yet another round of response and counterresponse.
Even more serious are the potential costs to technological
priority a company placed on information security and the amount of loss the company reported.
See 2002 ASIS Survey Report, supra note 7, §§ 3.9-3.11, § 4, at 18-25, 27 (concluding that
"[r]esearch data about attitudes and best practices reveals that many companies do not follow
important basic information protection policies"); see also 1995 ASIS Survey Report, supra
note 9, at 19-29 (detailing widespread failure to implement basic security precautions and urging
firms to develop systematic and comprehensive Safeguarding Proprietary Information (SPI)
Programs); NASHERI, supra note 5, at 65 (noting that a "lax attitude and insensitivity to secrets
is common in the business world.")
20. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 273-79, 281 (1998). Professor Rustad recommends using punitive
damages to encourage private lawsuits, but the availability of punitive damages can exacerbate
enforcement cost problems. Id. at 313.
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innovation. By rewarding secrecy, trade secret law encourages firms
to keep secrets, and secrecy impedes the diffusion of information.
When one firm's stronger trade secrecy prevents other firms from
building on the information, the pace of innovation is likely to slow
2
with negative effects on economic productivity. 1
In sum, while it is natural for a trade secret owner to want to
safeguard its secrets from all forms of appropriation and thus to push
for ever broader legal protection, these incentives are not necessarily
optimal for society at large because of the externalities that trade
secret law creates. These externalities include expensive litigation,
wasteful arms races over detection, and impediments to innovation.
The fact is that firms currently have access to state trade secret
remedies and may sue both foreign and domestic misappropriators
22
when jurisdictional and other procedural requirements are satisfied.
Given the empirical uncertainty and the potentially serious costs, I am
skeptical about the wisdom of adding to these remedies by
strengthening the EEA.
III. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION

In this section, I assume, for purposes of argument, that there is a
serious trade secret theft problem warranting legal reform, and I focus
on whether secondary liability makes sense as a solution. First, I
21. Id. at 266-67. This is especially problematic when a firm chooses trade secrecy rather
than patent to protect its patentable invention, since doing so frustrates the Patent Act's strong
policy in favor of public disclosure. See id. at 269. The adverse impact of secrecy on
innovation is illustrated by well-known studies of Silicon Valley and Route 128, which highlight
the benefits of porous secrecy protection in facilitating information diffusion through employee
mobility.
See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (focusing on the California rule
prohibiting enforcement of covenants not to compete). Indeed, trade secret owners could end up
in a Prisoners' Dilemma, in which they take advantage of strong trade secret protection when it
is offered even though they would be better off if they all could credibly commit themselves to
refrain.
22. Professor Rustad also argues that the current system of state remedies ought to be
replaced by a federal statute in order to achieve uniformity and to tap the expertise of federal
courts. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 514. 1 am not convinced, however, that much would be
gained by federalizing trade secret law. The core features of state law are fairly uniform already
(although there are some variations, as Professor Rustad notes), and the expertise of federal
judges is not readily transferable from copyright and patent to trade secret because of the
distinctive liability theories underlying these different forms of protection. In any event, even if
the arguments for a federal claim are persuasive, adding a private claim to the EEA is not the
best way to do it. Rather than gerry-rig a statute that was never designed for private
enforcement, it would be better if Congress considered the matter anew and constructed an
appropriate federal statute from scratch.
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review secondary liability doctrine generally in the trade secret field
and speculate on some reasons for its relative scarcity. Then I
examine software defects and Professor Rustad's proposal.
A.

Secondary Liability Generally in the Trade Secret Field

Secondary liability is liability imposed on a third party who
actively induces, materially contributes to, fails to control, or in some
other significant way facilitates the infringing acts of others. The key
feature of the doctrine is that it holds a party liable for the underlying
infringement even though that party does not itself do the infringing
act.
Although the secondary liability doctrines of contributory
infringement, vicarious liability, and active inducement play an
important role in other areas of intellectual property law, especially
copyright and patent, they do not play a significant role in trade secret
law. 23 The principal trade secret doctrine imposing liability on third
parties is in fact based on a form of primary rather than secondary
liability. This doctrine holds that a third party is liable when the third
party acquires a trade secret from another and then discloses or uses
the secret under circumstances where he knows or should have known
that the trade secret was wrongfully acquired. 24 The third party is
liable for his own use or disclosure, and the knowledge requirement
assures some degree of individual culpability.
The one genuine example of secondary liability in trade secret
law is the respondeat superior liability of employers for trade secret
misappropriation by their employees. Yet even here the case law is
quite thin and the opinions relatively recent. 25 Notably, those judges
23. I base this conclusion on a search of the indices of the major trade secret treatises,
which, with one exception covered in the text of this Comment, do not list "secondary liability,"
"contributory infringement," "vicarious liability," or "respondeat superior." Moreover, the
Third Restatement of Unfair Competition does not include a secondary liability theory; it
confines the liability of third parties to the principles discussed here. Finally, a search for
federal and state cases in LEXIS, using combinations of "trade secret" and one of the
aforementioned phrases, revealed only the few employer respondeat superior cases discussed in
this Comment.
24. See, e.g., UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § l(2)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(b)(3) & cmt. d (1995). Conversely, a
third party who acquires a trade secret from another without actual or constructive knowledge
that the trade secret was wrongfully acquired is not liable for use or disclosure of the trade
secret, at least not until the third party learns about the misappropriation.
25. See, e.g., Newport News Indus. v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 130 F.Supp.2d 745, 749-54
(E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that respondeat superior liability is consistent with the Virginia
Uniform Trade Secrets Act); Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 503-05 (Minn.
2001) (recognizing respondeat superior liability under Minnesota trade secret law).
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who make an effort to analyze the issue struggle to square respondeat
superior liability with traditional trade secret principles. 2 6 These
justificatory difficulties are instructive, for they suggest that there is
no strong tradition of secondary liability in trade secret law. The
question is why.
One possible answer is that trade secret law has less need for
secondary liability than does copyright and patent law. In copyright,
for example, a major reason for secondary liability is to solve certain
enforcement problems and encourage less costly methods of
preventing infringement. 27 For instance, when there are many
potential infringers under the control of a third party with the ability
to reduce or eliminate the infringements, holding the third party liable
on a contributory infringement or vicarious liability theory saves
transaction costs and can prevent the infringements more efficiently
than suing all the direct infringers individually.
The obvious
litigation cost advantages give copyright owners a reason to push for
recognition of secondary liability, and the efficiency benefits give
judges a reason to respond favorably. Similarly, when the direct
infringers are judgment proof (as might be the case for young
musicians and artists living on a shoe string), copyright owners have
an incentive to seek secondary liability doctrines that make it possible
to reach third parties with deeper pockets.
Cases like these-involving multiple direct infringers under the
control of a third party or infringers who are judgment proof-are
much less likely to arise in the trade secret field. As a result, there are
probably fewer occasions for plaintiffs to seek secondary liability and
fewer opportunities for judges to consider it. For instance, trade
secret cases do not normally involve multiple misappropriations by
separate individuals under the common control of a third party.
Misappropriation is usually a single, discrete act performed by one or
a small number of persons, all of whom can be easily sued in the
same lawsuit.
Furthermore, many trade secret cases involve
employees who take their former employer's trade secrets to their

26. Most of these cases deal with the issue in the context of state statutes modeled on the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. One of the difficulties involves reconciling respondeat superior
liability with the traditional rule, codified in the UTSA, that a third party without knowledge
cannot be held liable. See, e.g., Newport News Indus. supra note 25, at 752-54; see also Infinity
Prods. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1033-34 (Ind. 2004) (rejecting respondeat superior liability
under the Indiana trade secret statute because the statute requires actual or constructive
knowledge on the employer's part).
27. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 395, 397-99 (2003).
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new employment. 28 The problem of the judgment-proof defendant
will not arise in these cases if the new employer has sufficient assets
to pay the judgment, since the new employer itself can be held liable
on grounds of actual or constructive knowledge or on a theory of
29
respondeat superior.
Another possible reason for the relative scarcity of secondary
liability doctrine in trade secret law has to do with doctrinal
differences between trade secret and other intellectual property
theories. Copyright and patent create forms of strict liability for welldefined acts, and the class of direct infringers is limited to those who
do one of those acts. No one else can be a direct infringer, no matter
how involved they are in the infringing activity. For example, the
Copyright Act imposes liability on anyone who "publicly performs" a
copyrighted work without permission, and the Act defines "to
'
perform a work" as to "recite, render, play, dance, or act it." 30
Therefore, a concert promoter who profits from promoting a singer
while knowing that the singer performs copyrighted songs illegally
does nothing that directly infringes copyright, despite his obvious
culpability. One needs a secondary liability doctrine-in this case,
contributory infringement-to hold the promoter liable.
Trade secret law is not based on strict liability. The acquisition,
use, or disclosure of a trade secret must involve a breach of
confidence or some other type of wrongful conduct. This requirement
narrows the scope of liability as compared with copyright and patent.
But it also makes it easier to catch culpable third parties in the direct
liability net. For example, a person who encourages or entices
another to misappropriate a trade secret, and then profits from the use,
can easily be seen as a primary wrongdoer directly liable for the
unlawful use. 31 There is no need in such a case to struggle over
refined distinctions between primary and secondary liability.

28. See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 5.01 ("[T]he great majority of reported trade secret
cases arise in the context of the employer-employee relationship.").
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 24, § 40, cmt. d,
illus. 2 (actual or constructive knowledge of the misappropriation); see also supra text
accompanying notes 25-26 (discussing respondeat superior).
30. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (definition of "to perform"), 106(4) (right of public performance)
(2000).
31. See 2 MILGRIM, supra note 17, § 7.02 [4] [a] (explaining the rules for holding parties
liable for inducing or conspiring in trade secret misappropriation).
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B. Secondary Liabilityfor Computer Software and Professor
Rustad's Proposal
The fact that secondary liability has not historically been terribly
important to trade secret law does not mean that the doctrine should
not be applied to computer software manufacturers and vendors in the
way Professor Rustad recommends. However, whether it is a good
idea to do so depends on the costs and benefits.
The first thing to note is that Professor Rustad's proposal differs
from the typical secondary liability case. In cases like Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,32 A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.,33 and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.,34 the product in question was used directly by the infringers to
carry out their infringements. In the scenario Professor Rustad
contemplates, the product (computer software) is used by the trade
secret owner to protect its trade secrets. It is a software defect that
renders those secrets vulnerable to misappropriation.
In the following discussion, I will first consider the secondary
liability question in its more conventional form, and then address it in
the context of Professor Rustad's proposal.
1. Conventional Secondary Liability for Distribution of
Computer Software
In the conventional secondary liability case paralleling Sony,
Napster, and Grokster, a vendor sells software to consumers, some of
whom use the software to penetrate a firm's security and
misappropriate its trade secrets. In this situation, liability has nothing
to do with defects in the software. It has to do instead with how the
software is used.
Secondary liability makes sense for software programs designed
and marketed with the intent that they be used as tools of
misappropriation, such as a hacking program created and distributed
by a proud hacker. This scenario falls squarely under the inducement
theory articulated by the Supreme Court in the Grokster case.
However, the scenario is not likely to involve legitimate software
companies.
Beyond this obvious and extreme case, it is highly doubtful that
the benefits of secondary liability justify the costs. It is possible, in

32.
33.
34.

464 U.S. 417 (1984).
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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theory at least, to imagine a software program marketed for legal
purposes that is frequently used or adapted to misappropriate trade
secrets. In such a case, it might be more effective to enjoin the
software vendor than to pursue each of the many misappropriators
individually. But there are at least three serious problems with this
secondary liability approach.
First, as cases in the copyright and patent fields make clear, it is
important to confine secondary liability based on selling a lawful
article of commerce to situations where the illegal use of the article is
sufficiently pervasive. 35 This requirement creates problems for the
trade secret case because proving that a software program is being
used pervasively for misappropriation is bound to be extremely
difficult. By contrast, proof of illegal use is relatively easy in
copyright cases like Sony and Napster because of the nature of the
technology and the relative simplicity of the illegal act.
Second, trade secret thieves have a variety of tools to achieve
their illegal objectives. Enjoining the software vendor deprives them
of only one such tool, and they are likely to respond by switching to
another. As a result, it is not clear that secondary liability will
significantly reduce the rate of serious trade secret theft. To be sure,
the alternative methods might be more costly, but if the value of the
trade secret is substantial enough, the additional cost should be no
impediment. At the limit, the misappropriator will just bribe current
36
employees or place its own agents inside the company.
Third, imposing secondary liability on software vendors is likely
to chill software innovation. A software company interested in
developing a new software product would have to take into account
the possibility that its product would be used or adapted for illegal
purposes and that its sale may be enjoined by a court. Limiting relief
to reasonable damages can reduce this chilling effect, but it is not
clear how to formulate a damage remedy to fit a large aggregate of
trade secret violations. In a secondary liability copyright case like
Sony or Napster, it is possible to use statistical sampling techniques to
get a rough idea of the frequency of unauthorized copying, and then
apply the statutory damage provisions to arrive at an aggregate

35. Otherwise, the risk of liability will chill innovation and give the copyright or patent
owner-and here the trade secret owner--excessive control over promising technology.
36. Employee-based strategies for appropriating trade secrets are a very common
technique. Indeed, Professor Rustad finds in his examination of EEA cases that "employees, exemployees, and insiders were the primary wrongdoers in seventy-three percent of the EEA
prosecutions." Rustad, supra note 1, at 492.
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damage award. 3 7 However, statutory damages are not available in
trade secret cases. Instead, monetary relief is usually measured by a
plaintiffs actual loss or a defendant's illegal gain, and there is no
obvious statistical way to calculate these amounts on an aggregate
38
basis without identifying individual victims and individual losses.
2. Professor Rustad's Proposal: Liability for Negligent
Enablement of Trade Secret Theft
Professor Rustad's actual proposal could be considered a form of
secondary liability insofar as it imposes liability on a software vendor
for trade secret misappropriation perpetrated by another person.
However, it is better, I believe, to view it as a form of primary
liability based on the software vendor's primary negligence in
inadequately designing and testing its software product. The policy
behind the proposal-to encourage more careful testing-fits a
primary negligence theory, and liability depends on the vendor's
failing to use reasonable care. Viewing the proposal this way, the
desired end is to improve the security of software and the
recommended means is to include trade secret loss in the remedy for
39
negligence.
Many critics agree with Professor Rustad that software testing
procedures are too lax and that companies today sell software
products with easily preventable security defects. If this is true,
negligence liability for some types of losses might improve testing
and encourage the production of more secure software. The question,
however, is whether negligence liability should extend to trade secret
losses. From a doctrinal perspective, the issue can be treated as one
of causation. Should negligently defective software be considered the
cause of a trade secret loss when someone else-the trade secret
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000) (authorizing statutory damages for copyright
infringement).
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 24, § 45. It might
be possible to use a reasonable royalty measure and make the royalty uniform across all cases,
but there would still be a problem estimating the frequency of misappropriation.
39. Professor Rustad's proposal requires two things: (1) negligence on the part of the
software vendor, and (2) an unlawful appropriation of a trade secret. This creates a potential
problem. A firm must have reasonable secrecy precautions in place before it can bring a trade
secret claim. If software testing is considered a reasonable precaution, the trade secret owner
would have to test the software itself before it could complain of trade secret misappropriation.
But then its testing could eliminate any basis for holding the software vendor liable. To avoid
this problem, I shall assume that the EEA under Professor Rustad's proposal does not require
software testing as one of the reasonable precautions necessary to qualify secret information as a
trade secret. This assumption would make sense as a policy matter if it is less costly for the
software vendor to test once than for all the buyers to test separately.
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thief-actually does the dirty deed and could have used other means
to accomplish it? From a policy perspective, the issue is one of costbenefit balancing. What is the optimal balance between the costs of
chilling software innovation and the benefits of reducing trade secret
loss?

40

Let us focus on the policy problem. The chilling effect is easy to
understand. Under Professor Rustad's proposal, a software
manufacturer or vendor would have to pay all trade secret losses of
all its customers caused by unreasonable defects in its software
product. Damages for trade secret loss can be very large when only a
single firm is involved, and those damages are certain to compound
quickly when multiplied over a large number of firms. Even if, as
Professor Rustad suggests, reasonable care standards become clearer
over time, there is still a significant risk that a jury will find liability
no matter how carefully a company follows the teachings of past
41
cases.
Combined with a huge potential verdict, even a modest chance
of liability could trigger a risk-averse response, especially in smaller
software companies, and discourage new entry into particularly risky
software markets (such as the market for security software). 42 If this
occurs, competition would suffer, and with only a few companies in
the market, the pace of innovation would suffer too. Moreover, even
if companies do enter the market, they would have to charge a very

40. One rough analogy is the negligence liability of gun manufacturers for injuries or
deaths caused by the illegal use of handguns. See Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability
Without Cause? Further Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32
CONN. L. REv. 1379 (2000). This issue also involves uncertain causation and potentially
burdensome liability.
41. Indeed, the software field is so dynamic that a plaintiffs attorney should often be able
to point to better testing procedures and argue that the defendant should have known about and
used those procedures. The defendant might still prevail in the end, but the availability of these
arguments enhances the risks.
42. Professor Rustad refers at times to "known defects" and sometimes describes the
software vendor's duty in terms of using "readily available means" to enhance software security.
These references suggest the possibility that Professor Rustad means to confine negligent
enablement liability to proof of recklessness-in other words, to situations where the defendant
fails to take relatively inexpensive and obvious steps to safeguard against clear risks from
known defects. If this is what he has in mind, the chilling effect of his proposal would be
significantly reduced, but so too would its effectiveness in creating incentives for more secure
software. In most of the article, Professor Rustad describes his theory in ordinary negligence
terms - as embracing cases where the defendant not only knew but "should have known" of the
risks and where reasonable testing would have revealed the defect. Therefore, I shall assume
that Professor Rustad contemplates an ordinary negligence standard tailored, of course, to the
specific nature of the risks and costs involved in software design and use. See Rustad, supra
note 1.
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high price to cover insurance for the additional liability. Thus, an
attempt to reduce software defects could end up substantially
increasing the price of software and impeding the creation of better
software products--or at least significantly delaying their
introduction into the market.
This risk might be worth taking if the deterrence benefits were
great enough, but this is not likely to be the case. As noted above,
there are many different ways to misappropriate trade secrets other
than penetrating a firm's software. If software is more secure,
someone bent on acquiring the firm's trade secret will probably just
switch to another method, such as bribing employees or placing an
agent in the company--or maybe even figuring out new ways to
penetrate the firm's software shield. 43 Thus, Professor Rustad's
negligent enablement liability could impose an onerous burden on
software companies without doing much to prevent the most serious
trade secret losses.
There is another reason to question Professor Rustad's proposal:
contract law might be a better way than tort law to control the risks of
trade secret loss. It is true, as Professor Rustad points out, that
contract law works poorly for mass-marketed software because
manufacturers use shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses to disclaim
liability. But firms with valuable trade secrets have an option other
than buying the mass-marketed product. They should be able to
contract individually with the manufacturer or vendor for software
that has been more extensively tested and meets the firm's particular
security needs (and perhaps also includes warranties against loss).
There are advantages to the contract approach. One advantage is
that the software product can be tested and customized to fit the
overall software needs of the contracting firm. Another advantage is
that it can facilitate efficient price discrimination. Since ordinary
consumers do not face the same risks as trade secret owners, it seems
reasonable to suppose that they would prefer a less carefully tested
product if they could buy it at a lower price. The contract solution
allows for this market segmentation. Ordinary consumers can pay the
mass-market price while trade secret owners pay a higher price for a
more secure product.
43. Experience with encryption teaches that there are plenty of clever programmers who
enjoy the challenge of figuring out ways to circumvent novel security measures. In fact, in a
footnote discussing the problem of multiple causation, Professor Rustad assumes that there can
be more than one way to access trade secret information, but he fails to recognize how the
availability of alternatives threatens the deterrence benefits of his proposal. See Rustad, supra
note 1, at 502 n.200.
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There are potential problems with the contract solution, but I do
not think they are disqualifying. For example, a firm might be
reluctant to pay for additional software testing if it believes that the
company will just sell the better tested product to everyone, including
the firm's competitors. Under these circumstances, each firm would
have an incentive to free-ride on the others. However, the software
manufacturer could apportion the additional testing costs among all
its corporate customers if coordination is not too difficult. 44
In sum, before holding software manufacturers or vendors liable
for trade secret loss on a negligent enablement theory, one should first
be confident that the social costs of chilling software innovation and
increasing the price of software products do not outweigh the
marginal benefit of reducing trade secret theft. I am not at all
confident that this is the case, and therefore counsel restraint in
implementing Professor Rustad's proposal. Restraint is all the more
important because there is a potentially superior alternative to
negligent enablement, namely, relying on contract to allocate the risk
of loss.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Rustad's proposal is intriguing. However, much more
empirical and normative work is necessary before its merits can be
fully evaluated. Secondary liability has never been a prominent
feature of trade secret law, and there are strong reasons to exercise
44. The contract solution works better when the software market is more competitive,
since in a competitive market new entrants would supply the better-tested product if the original
manufacturer refused to do so (and it was profitable). As one participant at the conference
pointed out, the market for some types of software, such as operating systems, is not terribly
competitive due to the lock-in effect of network externalities and the availability of exclusive
intellectual property rights. However, I do not believe that this concern warrants rejection of the
contract approach. Just because the software manufacturer has market power does not mean that
there will be no contracts. It just means that the contract price will be higher. Even if a
monopolist insists for some reason on selling only the mass-marketed version, trade secret
owners could simply purchase that version and test for and correct any defects on their own.
Admittedly, this alternative is not socially optimal. The manufacturer should be a more efficient
tester since it knows its own product, and each purchasing firm testing on its own creates
wasteful duplication of effort. However, assuming no antitrust obstacles, trade secret owners
could form a coalition to negotiate collectively with the software manufacturer, or pool their
resources to do the testing and modifying only once. It is possible that testing and modifying the
software might run into copyright problems, especially if the code has to be reproduced in the
testing process. But the resulting copyright infringements should be treated as fair use. Cf Sega
Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that disassembly of a
copyrighted computer program is a fair use when the disassembly is the "only way to gain
access to the ideas and functional elements" in the program and "there is a legitimate reason for
seeking such access").
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restraint in extending it to software manufacturers and vendors.
Professor Rustad's proposal, in particular, is highly problematic,
whether it is treated as a form of secondary liability for trade secret
theft or a form of primary liability for negligence. In the end, I am
deeply skeptical that its likely benefits justify its inevitable costs.
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